



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COASTAL RIVERINE GROUP TWO
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD BLDG 1575
PORTSMOUTH, VA 23708-1041

5830
Ser N00L/173
18 Mar 13

FORWARDING ENDORSEMENT on CI - Navy Hotline 201300058

From: Commander, Coastal Riverine Group TWO
To: Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO NAVY HOTLINE 201300058,
ADDITIONAL COMPLAINT DATED 25 JAN 13 (REGARDING MSRON 12
EO/CMEO ISSUES), AND LETTER ENTITLED "MSRON 12 CO AND [REDACTED]
MISCONDUCT DURING 2011-2012," RECEIVED ON 30 JAN 13

Ref: (a) Command Investigation of [REDACTED] dtd 15 Mar
13

1. I concur in the findings of fact, opinions of reference (a). I concur in the recommendations except as otherwise specifically discussed in describing follow-on actions in this letter. CAPT David P. Hunter, the former Commanding Officer of MSRON 12, did not fulfill the duties or meet the expectations of a Commanding Officer. As a result, on 15 February 2013, I relieved him as the CO of MSRON 12, and, on 4 March 2013, he was found guilty of misconduct at NJP and awarded a punitive letter of reprimand. Furthermore, I am recommending that he be detached for cause and required to show cause for retention. Likewise, former [REDACTED] failed to fulfill the duties and meet the expectations of a [REDACTED]. As a result, on 15 February 2013, he was relieved of his duties as the [REDACTED]. On 28 February 2013, he was accordingly awarded NJP for violating the UCMJ and received a punitive letter of reprimand. Additionally, I have formally recommended that he be detached for cause and that his [REDACTED] be removed.

2. In general, the investigation revealed that CAPT Hunter created a work environment that resulted in poor command climate and low morale. Among the officers and crew he was viewed as divisive and developed a reputation for being neither trustworthy nor straightforward. CAPT Hunter became largely unapproachable and created an increasingly dangerous environment whereby subordinate personnel did not feel empowered to provide

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frank counsel or recommendations to their Commanding Officer without being ridiculed or having their own judgment questioned. The Command Triad was ineffective due to CAPT Hunter's unwillingness to empower, communicate with, and take counsel from either the Executive Officer or Command Master Chief.

3. CAPT Hunter inaccurately characterized the findings of the 2012 MSRON 12 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) survey in his Executive Summary of the survey to Coastal Riverine Group TWO (CRG-2) and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Moreover, the Executive Summary was not routed properly by MSRON 12. I have ensured proper routing of that Executive Summary, and also ensured review and proper routing of all prior Executive Surveys from other commands, as appropriate.

4. CAPT Hunter consistently exhibited unacceptable behavior in his treatment of subordinates, belittling and embarrassing officers and sailors in public on numerous occasions. Specifically, in September 2012, at a Department Head meeting, he unduly embarrassed and belittled a Coast Guard Commander in front of a number of junior personnel. In January 2013, he embarrassed and belittled a Second Class Petty Officer at an "All Hands" call in front of approximately 60 personnel, cutting off the sailor in mid-question and moving into a lecture which unjustifiably questioned the sailor's patriotism and commitment to the mission. Finally, on several occasions, CAPT Hunter belittled and embarrassed his Command Master Chief and Executive Officer in front of other personnel. In short, he failed to accord his subordinate personnel the minimal level of dignity and respect expected of a Commanding Officer.

5. On one occasion, in his office, CAPT Hunter unprofessionally threw three command coins at his Executive Officer at the conclusion of a meeting between himself and the Executive Officer. While it does not appear that CAPT Hunter intended to physically hurt his Executive Officer, such conduct was inappropriate and inexcusable.

6. During the two most recent Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA) cycles, CAPT Hunter failed to have the required number of observers present during his two most recent personal "weigh-ins," leading to rumors and accusations that he was failing to

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adhere to PFA regulations. Through this conduct, CAPT Hunter set a poor example and reinforced a perception amongst subordinates that he was "above the rules."

7. CAPT Hunter grossly mishandled the Equal Opportunity Complaint of an E-5 who was seeking redress of inappropriate comments made to him by his [REDACTED]. CAPT Hunter inappropriately denied requests for members of the sailor's chain of command to be present during a one-on-one interview between himself and the Petty Officer to address the complaint. As a result, the Petty Officer chose to surreptitiously record the interview. During the interview, the Petty Officer makes repeated references to his "formal" EO complaint and questioned why formal EO processes were not followed. Towards the end of the interview, CAPT Hunter indicated that the "formal" process would be adhered to. It was not. Regarding his handling of the complaint, CAPT Hunter accepted NJP on a specification of "dereliction of duty," and was punished accordingly. Furthermore, during his interview with the Investigating Officer on this issue, CAPT Hunter misrepresented facts of his conversation with the Petty Officer; specifically: (a) CAPT Hunter said that the Petty Officer never indicated that he wanted a formal complaint; and, (b) CAPT Hunter said that he never told the Petty Officer that the MSRON-12 CMEC was his "victim advocate." Both of these statements are in conflict with the recorded conversation.

8. The MSRON 12 CMEC during the events involving the aforementioned Petty Officer's complaint was an E-6. I concur that the CMEC should have made greater efforts to ensure proper processing of the E-5's EO complaint and intend to take appropriate administrative action against the CMEC. In addition, this former CMEC has been replaced by an E-7. However, I also believe that CAPT Hunter was ultimately responsible for proper processing, CAPT Hunter did not sufficiently oversee the EO process in this case, and his general leadership style resulted in the CMEC being unable to effectively approach the CO on certain aspects of this matter.

9. In December 2012, CAPT Hunter failed to ensure proper reporting and investigation of suspected "prostitution and pandering" of two sailors. First, CAPT Hunter failed to fully

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inform his operational immediate superior in command of the details of the incident, although he was aware he should do so. Regarding this issue, CAPT Hunter accepted NJP on a specification of "dereliction of duty," and was punished accordingly. Second, he specifically decided that certain available evidence should not be obtained. The matter has now been re-investigated, but due to the lapse of time, potentially revealing evidence has been destroyed - specifically, hotel video and guest registers. Both sailors will be counseled on the matter.

10. MSRON 12 did not properly manage E-6 evaluations (EVALs). For the 2012 cycle, CRG-2 identified 44 personnel missing 2012 evaluations in Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System (NSIPS). Of those Service Members, 21 of them were mobilized and therefore should have had a 23 August 2013 mobilization evaluation signed by CAPT Hunter via AUC 55853. The remaining should have received a November Periodic evaluations signed by their Detachment OICs. Of the 44 identified as missing or late in (NSIPS), nine of the 2012 evaluations were found in the service member's Official Military Personnel File (OMPF), four are reflected as received in the Detachment OICs Reporting Senior's Cumulative Average (RSCA), but are not updated in the servicemember's record, and one of sailors was separated from the Navy prior to 2012. Seven of the evaluations have been confirmed as missing and the Detachment OICs are being contacted to either write replacements and/or provide signed copies to forward to Navy Personnel Command (PERS). I will continue to pursue the remaining evaluation anomalies until all outstanding evaluations are on file with PERS and available to the member, and will report when this action is completed.

11. In a separate investigation related to a separate complaint, I have substantiated allegations that MSRON 12 also mismanaged the administration of E-7 evaluations. In regards to that matter, all defects in evaluation submissions have been identified and rectified.

12. MSRON 12 failed to properly track and manage PFA failures. Specifically, CRG-2 has confirmed 18 personnel who should not have been mobilized as per the ECRC checklist. Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC) Individual Augmentee (IA) policy

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stipulates that to mobilize, a service member cannot have failed two PFAs within the past three years. Further inquiry is pending into whether the mobilization cycle PFA (2012-2) counts as one of those two failures - two personnel fall into this category. There are four personnel that are currently mobilized who have failed three or more PFAs in the last four years - they will be administratively separated once Page 13s are updated. We have verified that the Command Fitness Leader (CFL) was inputting the appropriate data into PRIMS but Manpower Availability Status (MAS) codes were not being updated appropriately at the Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC). Proper MAS code data would have prevented the service members at issue from routing beyond the initial nomination as an IA. CRG-2 will continue to investigate the possibility that the CFL and the Mobilization Officer were led to believe that more than two failures were acceptable - a meeting with both the NOSC and Navy Mobilization Processing Site (NMPS) Norfolk COs is pending. CRG-2 will pursue waivers for the remaining 12 personnel from Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) so as not to fall below critical Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAL) force tracking number requirements in theatre. We are also investigating policies surrounding service members who have been on numerous "back-to-back" mobilizations and have therefore not been subject to a PFA for a number of years and appear out of standards. CRG-2 will also ensure that all Reserve Squadrons are provided direction and training to ensure that all mobilized personnel are within standards and that MAS code updates are pursued and tracked.

13. Numerous witness statements attest to the fact that CAPT Hunter had a tendency to tell subordinates to execute tasks in a certain manner, and then later deny he told subordinates to do so. I find this allegation to be substantiated - CAPT Hunter's actions in this regard are another example of his defect in leadership.

14. For reasons that included expediency and efficiency, I ultimately elected, within my authority and discretion, to only pursue charges against CAPT Hunter for: (a) negligent dereliction of duty as to his mishandling of the formal EO complaint of a Second Class Petty Officer; and, (b) his failure to properly report the details of an investigation into alleged

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criminal offense to his operational chain of command. However,
in concurrence with the findings and opinions of the
investigating officer, I also find sufficient evidence to
substantiate the following allegations:

- a. submission of an inaccurate DEOMI Executive Survey;
- b. failure of sufficient oversight in administrating
enlisted evaluations;
- c. failure to have a sufficient number of observers at his
personal weigh-ins on the two most recent PFA cycles;
- d. failure to properly monitor PFA failures of his
personnel, in regards to both mobilization eligibility and
administrative separation processing;
- e. making two misrepresentations/false statements to the
Investigating Officer;
- f. failure to exercise due diligence in investigating
possible prostitution and pandering regarding two enlisted
personnel under his charge;
- g. inappropriately and unprofessionally throwing three
command coins at his Executive Officer; and,
- h. publicly belittling and embarrassing officers and
enlisted personnel on multiple occasions.

15. The MSRON 12 [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] made numerous inappropriate comments - sexist, racist,
and otherwise inappropriate - to various Sailors on various
occasions at MSRON 12. He was punished at NJP for these
comments. In addition, he had an unduly familiar relationship
with a subordinate Senior Chief Petty Officer and has been
awarded a Letter of Instruction (LOI) as a result. I will also
issue an LOI to the Senior Chief involved in the unduly familiar
relationship.

16. I intend to issue an LOI to [REDACTED] in
regards to the public comments he made to the following effect:

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"you are endangering my ability to see my family on liberty if
you did not perform well," comments uttered in October 2012 to
various MSRON 12 Boat Department personnel.

17. In the December 2011 to January 2012 timeframe, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] utilized
military personnel under his charge to assist in moving his
household goods. Although he did not specifically order any
sailors to do this, he did personally request volunteers within
MSRON 12, actions which led to perceptions of favoritism and
unfair treatment amongst some sailors. Such conduct was
inconsistent with the rules and principles of the Joint Ethics
Regulation and reflected poorly on [REDACTED]. In response,
I will issue an LOI to [REDACTED]

18. I find all other allegations to be either unsubstantiated
or sufficiently resolved, consistent with the findings,
opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer.

19. Point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] USN, available by phone at [REDACTED], or email
at [REDACTED].


J. C. HAMBLET

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